

To Mr. Martin - ARH

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Foster

October 17, 1962

Mr. Secretary:

This morning you asked us to assume that any Soviet decision to provide offensive military equipment to Cuba was made prior to July 1, 1962 and to see whether any US statements about the Soviet military build-up in Cuba prior to that date should have given Khrushchev cause ~~to~~^{for} caution.

In the time available, we have not been able to do an absolutely thorough check. We have not, for example, been able to examine US press analysis to see whether possible backgrounders had ever suggested this line. We have, however, unearthed the three attached Departmental statements. As you will see, they are by no means couched in terms calculated to give the Soviets any particular pause.

1. The statement dated January 10, 1962 was prepared in connection with the Punta del Este meeting. We understand that it was not used at the meeting but subsequently released to selected newsmen here. It takes a rather complacent view of the possibility that "bombers, naval craft, and possibly short-range tactical guided missiles might eventually be delivered to Cuba.

2. The same view was taken in a statement prepared for the noon briefing on February 5, 1962.

3. The Department's press release of March 27, 1962 does not go into the question of future Soviet military deliveries to Cuba.

If you wish we can pursue this question further.

Joseph W. Neubert
Special Assistant

Attachments

Three Departmental statements